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Abstract. Despite their performance, Artificial Neural Networks are
not reliable enough for most of industrial applications. They are sensi-
tive to noises, rotations, blurs and adversarial examples. There is a need
to build defenses that protect against a wide range of perturbations, cov-
ering the most traditional common corruptions and adversarial examples.
We propose a new data augmentation strategy called M-TLAT and de-
signed to address robustness in a broad sense. Our approach combines
the Mixup augmentation and a new adversarial training algorithm called
Targeted Labeling Adversarial Training (TLAT). The idea of TLAT is
to interpolate the target labels of adversarial examples with the ground-
truth labels. We show that M-TLAT can increase the robustness of image
classifiers towards nineteen common corruptions and five adversarial at-
tacks, without reducing the accuracy on clean samples.
Keywords: Neural Network, Robustness, Common Corruptions, Ad-
versarial Training, Mixup
1 Introduction
Artificial neural networks have been proven to be very efficient in various im-
age processing tasks [26],[38],[43]. Unfortunately, in real-world computer vision
applications, a lot of common corruptions may be encountered such as blurs, col-
orimetry variations, or noises, etc. Such corruptions can dramatically decrease
neural network efficiency [11],[7],[23],[48]. Besides, deep neural networks can be
easily attacked with adversarial examples [42]. These attacks can reduce the
performance of most of the state-of-the-art neural networks to zero [1],[37].
Some techniques have been proposed to make neural networks more robust.
When a specific perturbation is considered, we can build a defense to protect a
neural network against it, whether it is a common corruption [25],[58],[48] or an
adversarial attack [33],[54],[39]. However, increasing robustness towards a spe-
cific perturbation generally does not help with another kind of perturbation. For
instance, geometric transformation robustness is orthogonal with worst-case ad-
ditive noise [10]. Fine tuning on blur does not increase the robustness to Gaussian
noise [8]. Even worse, making a model robust to one specific perturbation can
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make it more sensitive to another one. For instance, a data augmentation with
corruptions located in the high frequency domain tends to decrease the robust-
ness to corruptions located in the low frequency domain [55]. Besides, increasing
adversarial robustness often implies a diminution of the clean accuracy (the ac-
curacy of a model on not-corrupted samples) [27],[47]. Therefore, a company or
a public organism may feel reluctant to use neural networks in their projects
since it is hard to make them robust to a large diversity of corruptions, and it is
difficult to predict how a neural network will react to unexpected corruptions.
There is a need to build new defenses that address robustness in a broad sense,
covering the most encountered common corruptions and adversarial examples.
We propose to address this issue with a new data augmentation approach
called M-TLAT. M-TLAT is a combination of Mixup [57] and a new kind of
adversarial training called Targeted Labeling Adversarial Training (TLAT). The
idea of this adversarial training is to label target adversarial examples with soft
labels that contain information about the used target. We show that M-TLAT
can increase the robustness of image classifiers to nineteen common corruptions
and five adversarial attacks, without reducing the accuracy on clean samples.
This algorithm is easy to implement and to integrate to an existing training
process. It intends to make the neural networks used in real-world applications
more reliable.
2 Related Works
2.1 Protecting Neural Networks against Common Corruptions
Neural Networks are known to be sensitive to a lot of perturbations such as
noises [25], rotations [11], blurs [48] or colorimetry variations [23], etc. We call
these perturbations common corruptions. They are often encountered in indus-
trial applications, but generally absent from academic datasets. For instance the
faces in the dataset celeba are always well illuminated with a consistent eyes
positioning [32], yet those conditions are not always guaranteed in the indus-
trial applications. Because of common corruptions, the performance of a neural
network can be surprisingly low [14].
There are a few methods that succeded in increasing the robustness to sev-
eral common corruptions simoultaneously. Among them, the robust pre-training
algorithm proposed by Liu et al. can make classifiers more robust to noises, oc-
clusions and blurs [31]. In [13], it is proposed to change the style of the training
images using style transfer [12]. Neural networks trained this way are obliged to
focus more on shapes than textures. The Augmix algorithm proposes to inter-
polate a clean image with perturbed versions of this image [18]. The obtained
images are used to augment the training set of a neural network. These methods
are useful to make neural networks more robust to common corruptions but they
do not address the case of adversarial examples.
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2.2 Protecting Neural Networks against Adversarial Examples
Adversarial Examples are another threat that can make neural networks give un-
expected answers [42]. Unlike common corruptions they are artificial distortions.
They are crafted by humans so as to especially fool neural networks. Adversarial
examples can completely fool even the state-of-the-art models [27]. Those per-
turbations are even more dangerous because humans can hardly see if an image
has been adversarially corrupted or not [1],[37]. In other words, a system can be
attacked without anyone noticing it. They are two kinds of adversarial examples
called white-box and black-box attacks.
White-box attacks. The attacker has access to the whole target network:
its parameters and its architecture. White-box attacks are tailored so as to espe-
cially fool a specific network. White-box adversarial examples are very harmful,
defending a model against it is a tough task [47],[40],[3].
Black-Box attacks. An adversarial example crafted with a limited access
to the targeted network is called a black-box attack. When only the training set
of a neural network is known, it is still possible to make a transfer attack. Con-
sidering a dataset and two neural networks trained with it, it has been shown
that an adversarial example crafted using one of the models, can harm the other
one [42],[15]. This phenomenon occurs even when the two models have distinct
architectures and parameters.
A lot of methods have been proposed to protect against adversarial exam-
ples. Adversarial training uses adversarial examples to augment the training set
of a neural network [33],[46]. Defense-Gan [39] and feature squeezing [54] are
used to remove adversarial patterns from images. Stochastic Activation Pruning
[6] and defensive dropout [51] make the internal operations of neural networks
more difficult to access in order to make these networks more difficult to attack.
These methods can significantly increase the robustness of neural networks to
adversarial examples but they do not provide any protection towards common
corruptions.
2.3 Addressing Robustness in a Broad Sense
The methods mentioned above increase either the adversarial robustness or the
robustness to common corruptions. Unfortunately, increasing the robustness to
common corruptions generally does not imply increasing the robustness to ad-
versarial examples and conversely [29]. The experiments carried out in [55] show
that data augmentation with traditional adversarial examples makes models less
robust to low frequency corruptions. Robustness to translations and rotations is
independent from robustness to the Lp bounded adversarial examples [10].
A natural approach to address robustness in a broad sense is to combine
defenses that address common corruptions with defenses that address adversarial
examples. Unfortunately, it is possible that two defenses are not compatible and
do not combine well [45],[55],[21].
4 A. Laugros et al.
A few standalone methods have been recently proposed to address adver-
sarial robustness and robustness to common corruptions at the same time. In
[34],[52], a large set of unlabeled data are leveraged to get a significant increase in
common corruption robustness and a limited increase in adversarial robustness.
However, using these methods has a prohibitive computational cost. Adversar-
ial Noise Propagation adds adversarial noise into the hidden layers of neural
networks during the training phase to address both robustnesses [30]. Adver-
sarial Logit Pairing (ALP) encourages trained models to output similar logits
for adversarial examples and their clean counterparts [22]. In addition to the
adversarial robustness provided, it has been reported that ALP increases the
robustness to some common corruptions [17]. The drawback of these methods is
that they reduce the clean accuracy of trained models.
To be useful in real-world applications, we want our method to preserve
the clean accuracy of the trained models, to increase the robustness to both
adversarial examples and common corruptions, and to be easy to integrate into
an existing training framework.
3 Combining Mixup with Targeted Labeling Adversarial
Training: M-TLAT
Fig. 1: Visualising of the generation of a new training couple using M-TLAT
Our approach called M-TLAT is a combination of two data augmentation
algorithms, which are Mixup [57] and a new adversarial training strategy called
Targeted Labeling Adversarial Training (TLAT). Basically, Mixup aims to in-
crease the common corruption robustness while TLAT aims to increase the ad-
versarial robustness. We go more into details in Section 5.3 to understand the
contribution of each component. In practice, we observe that those augmenta-
tions combine well to address robustness in a broad sense.
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3.1 Mixup
Let us consider the couples (xi, yi) and (xj , yj), where xi and xj are images
of the training set and yi and yj are their associated one-hot encoding labels.
Mixup [57] is a data augmentation algorithm that interpolates linearly samples
and labels (see Figure 1):
xmix = λ ∗ xi + (1− λ) ∗ xj
ymix = λ ∗ yi + (1− λ) ∗ yj
(1)
where λ is drawn from a Beta distribution defined by an hyperparameter α:
λ ∼ Beta(α, α). This augmentation strategy encourages the trained models to
have a linear behavior in-between training samples [57],[49]. In practice, Mixup
reduces the generalization error of classifiers, makes neural networks less sensitive
to corrupted labels and slightly improves the robustness to adversarial examples.
In the ablation study carried out in Section 5.3, we detail the influence of Mixup
on neural network robustness.
Augmenting datasets by interpolating samples of training sets have been
largely studied [44],[20]. Among the most successful, the Manifold Mixup inter-
polates hidden representations instead of interpolating the inputs directly [49].
The Mixup Inference proposes to use Mixup in the inference phase to degrade
the perturbations that may corrupt the input images [35]. Directional Adversar-
ial Training and Untied Mixup are alternative policies to pick the interpolation
ratios of the mixuped samples and labels [2]. The proposed M-TLAT algorithm
uses the standard Mixup, but it is not incompatible with the other interpolation
strategies mentioned in this paragraph.
3.2 Targeted Labeling Adversarial Training: TLAT
M-TLAT relies on a second data augmentation procedure: adversarial training,
which consists in adding adversarial examples into the training set [15],[33]. It is
one of the most efficient defenses against adversarial examples [3]. We consider
an unperturbed sample xclean of size S and its label yclean. We can corrupt xclean
to build an adversarial example xadv:
xadv = xclean + argmax
δ∈[−,]S
{L(xclean + δ, yclean, θ)}
yadv = yclean
(2)
Where θ are the parameters of the attacked model. L is a cost function like
the cross-entropy function. The value  defines the amount of the introduced
adversarial perturbation. As suggested in [1], adversarial training is even more
efficient when it uses adversarial examples that target a specific class ytarget.
The augmentation strategy becomes:
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xadv = xclean − argmax
δ∈[−,]S
{L(xclean + δ, ytarget, θ)}
yadv = yclean
(3)
One advantage to use target adversarial examples during training is to pre-
vent label leaking [27]. We propose to improve this augmentation strategy by
using ytarget in the labeling of the adversarial examples. In particular, we pro-
pose to mix the one-hot encoding ground-truth labels of the original samples
with the one-hot encoding target labels used to craft the adversarial examples:
xadv = xclean − argmax
δ∈[−,]S
{L(xclean + δ, ytarget, θ)}
yadv = (1− ) ∗ yclean +  ∗ ytarget
(4)
We call this augmentation strategy Targeted Labeling Adversarial Training
(TLAT). The argmax part is approximated with an adversarial example algo-
rithm such as target FGSM [1]:
xadv = xclean −  ∗ sign(∇xcleanL(xclean, ytarget, θ)) (5)
FGSM is used because it is a computationally efficient way to craft adver-
sarial examples [15],[46]. As for traditional adversarial trainings, models trained
with TLAT should be trained on both clean samples and adversarial samples [1].
The advantage of TLAT is to make models have a high clean accuracy compared
to the models trained with a standard adversarial training algorithm. More de-
tails can be found in Section 5.4.
TLAT uses soft labels instead of one-hot encoding labels. Using soft labels is
a recurrent idea in the methods that address robustness. As mentioned above,
Mixup interpolates training labels to generate soft labels [57]. Label smoothing
replaces the zeros of one-hot encoding labels by a smoothing parameter s > 0
and normalizes the high value so that the distribution still sums to one [41].
Distillation learning uses the logits of a trained neural network to train a second
neural network [36]. The second network is enforced to make smooth predictions
by learning on soft labels. Bilateral training generates soft labels by adversari-
ally perturb training labels [50]. It uses the gradient of the cost function of an
attacked model to generate adversarial labels. Models trained on both adver-
sarial examples and adversarial labels are encouraged to have a small gradient
magnitude which makes them more robust to adversarial examples.
The originality of TLAT is to use the target labels of adversarial attacks as a
component of the soft labels. Intuitions about why this labeling strategy works
are provided in Section 5.4.
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3.3 M-TLAT
The idea of M-TLAT is to generate new training couples by applying sequentially
the TLAT perturbations (4) after the Mixup interpolations (1):
xmtlat = xmix − argmax
δ∈[−,]S
{L(xmix + δ, ytarget, θ)}
ymtlat = (1− ) ∗ ymix +  ∗ ytarget
(6)
As displayed in Figure 1, xmtlat contains features that come from three dis-
tinct sources: two clean images and an adversarial perturbation that targets a
specific class. The label ymtlat contains the class and the weight associated with
each source of features. These weights are determined by the values λ and . A
model trained with M-TLAT is not only constraint to predict the classes that
correspond to the three sources. It also has to predict the weight of each source
within the features of xmtlat. We believe that being able to predict the class
and the weighting of the three sources requires a subtle understanding of the
features present in images. In practice, being trained with augmented couples
(xmtlat, ymtlat) makes neural networks more robust.
The expressions (6) are the essence of the algorithm. The whole process of
one training step with M-TLAT is provided in the algorithm description 1. As
recommended in [1], the training minibatches contain both adversarial and non-
adversarial samples. In our algorithm, the non-adversarial samples are obtained
using a standard Mixup interpolation, the adversarial samples are crafted by
combining Mixup and TLAT.
Another recently proposed approach combines Mixup and adversarial train-
ing [28]. Their method called Interpolated Adversarial Training (IAT) is differ-
ent from M-TLAT for two main reasons. Most importantly, they do not use
the labeling strategy of TLAT. Basically, their adversarially corrupted samples
are labeled using the standard Mixup interpolation while our labels contain in-
formation about the amount and the target of the used adversarial examples.
Secondly, we interpolate images before adding the adversarial corruptions. On
the contrary they adversarially corrupt images before mixing them up. In prac-
tice, we get better adversarial robustness when we proceed in our order. Besides,
proceeding in their order doubles the number of adversarial perturbations to
compute: it increases the training time. In Section 5.2, we compare the robust-
ness of two models trained with these approaches.
4 Experiment Set-up
4.1 Perturbation Benchmark
We want to evaluate the robustness of neural networks in a broad sense, covering
the most encountered common corruptions and adversarial examples. To achieve
this, we gather a large set of perturbations that contains nineteen common cor-
ruptions and five adversarial attacks.
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Algorithm 1 One training step of the M-TLAT algorithm
Require: θ the parameters of the trained neural network
Require: L a cross entropy function
Require: (x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3), (x4, y4) ∼ Dataset
Require: λ1, λ2 ∼ Beta(α, α)
Require:  ∼ U [0, max] where U is a uniform distribution and max is the maximum
perturbation allowed
Require: ytarget ∼ U [0, N ] where N is the number of classes
Require: optim an optimizer like Adam or SGD
xmix1 = λ1 ∗ x1 + (1− λ1) ∗ x2
ymix1 = λ1 ∗ y1 + (1− λ1) ∗ y2
xmix2 = λ2 ∗ x3 + (1− λ2) ∗ x4
ymix2 = λ2 ∗ y3 + (1− λ2) ∗ y4
xmtlat = xmix2 −  ∗ sign(∇xmix2L(xmix2, ytarget, θ))
ymtlat = (1− ) ∗ ymix2 +  ∗ ytarget
loss1 = L(xmix1, ymix1, θ)
loss2 = L(xmtlat, ymtlat, θ)
loss = loss1 + loss2
gradients = ∇θloss
optim.update(gradient, θ) The optimizer updates θ according to the gradients
Common Corruptions. The benchmark includes the common corruptions of
ImageNet-C [17]. The ImageNet-C set of perturbations contains diverse kinds of
common corruptions such as 1) noises: Gaussian noise, shot noise and impulse
noise 2) blurs: defocus blur, glass blur, motion blur and zoom blur 3) weather
related corruptions: snow, frost, fog and brightness 4) digital distortions: con-
trast, elastic, pixelate and jpeg compression. Each corruption is associated with
five severity levels. We use the corruption functions3 provided by the authors to
generate those perturbations.
The rotation, translation, color distortion and occlusion common corruptions
are absent from ImageNet-C, yet they are often encountered in industrial ap-
plications. We decided to add those four perturbations to the pool of common
corruptions. The occlusion perturbation is modeled by masking a randomly se-
lected region of images with a grey square. For the images corrupted with color
distortion, one of the RGB channel is randomly chosen and a constant is added
to all the pixels of this channel. For the rotation and translation perturbations,
the pixel values of the area outside the transformed images are set to zero.
These four corruptions are associated with a severity range. The lower bound
of the severity range has been set to reduce the accuracy of the standard ResNet-
50 by five percent on the test set. The upper bound has been set to reduce its
accuracy by thirty percent. As a result, the rotations can turn images from 8 to
3 https://github.com/hendrycks/robustness
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40 degrees. In other words, when the images of the test set are rotated by eight
degrees, the accuracy of the standard ResNet-50 is five percent lower than for a
not-corrupted test set. The side of the square mask used in the occlusions varies
from 60 to 127 pixels. The translations can move images from 15 to 62 pixels. For
the color distortion corruption, the values of the pixels of the perturbed channel
are increased from 8% to 30% of the maximum possible pixel value.
Adversarial Examples. Following the recommendations in [5], we carefully
choose the adversarial examples to be added to the benchmark. Firstly, we use
adversarial examples in both white box and black box settings. Secondly, we use
two different metrics, the L∞ and the L2 norms, to compute the bound of ad-
versarial attacks. Thirdly, we employ targeted and untargeted attacks. Fourthly,
several amounts of adversarial perturbations are used. Finally, the selected ad-
versarial examples are not used during trainings. We build a set of adversarial
examples to cover all the conditions mentioned above.
We note  the amount of the introduced perturbation in adversarial examples.
We use PGD with  = 0.04 as a white-box L∞ bounded attack [33]. We generate
targeted adversarial attacks by using PGD LL, which targets the least likely
class according to attacked models [1]. We use MI FGSM with  = 0.04 and
 = 0.08 as black-box attacks [9]. A VGG network trained on the same training
set is used to craft these black-box attacks. PGD, PGD LL and MI FGSM are
computed over ten iterations. We use the Carlini-Wagner attack (CW2) as a
L2 white-box bounded attack [4]. We perform the optimization process of this
attack with 40 iterations and a confidence score of 50.
The gathered common perturbations and adversarial examples constitute
the perturbation benchmark. It is used in the experimental section in order to
evaluate and compare the robustness of models.
4.2 Training Details
The trained models are either a ResNet-50 [16] or a ResNeXt-50 with the 32x4d
template [53]. We use a batch size of 256 and 90 training epochs. The Adam
optimizer [24] is used with a learning rate of 0.002 and a weight decay of 10−4.
At the end of the epochs 30, 60 and 80, the learning rate is divided by 10.
The cost function is the cross entropy. We use the same hyperparameters for all
trainings.
All models are trained and tested using ImageNet. Because of a limited com-
putational budget, we used a subset of ImageNet built on 100 randomly chosen
classes. For each class, ten percent of the images are preserved for the test set.
Then, the training set and the test set contain respectively 105 and 104 images.
The only pre-processing used is the resizing of images to the 224*224 format.
We call the models trained without any data augmentation the standard
models. We observed that the highest clean accuracy for the models trained
with mixup is reached when α = 0.4, so we used this value in all experiments.
The adversarial examples used in trainings are crafted using FGSM with  ∼
U [0, 0.025]. The range of pixel values of images in our experiments is [0, 1].
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5 Performance Evaluation
5.1 Robustness Score
To measure the robustness of a model to a perturbation, we compare the per-
formance of this model on clean samples with its performance on perturbed
samples:
RφN =
Aφ
Aclean
(7)
We call RφN the robustness score of a neural network N towards a perturba-
tion φ. Aclean is the accuracy of the model on the clean test set and Aφ is its
accuracy on the test set corrupted with the φ perturbation. φ can be either a
common corruption or an adversarial attack.
This robustness score metric should be used carefully because it masks the
clean accuracy of neural networks. Indeed, an untrained model that always makes
random outputs, would have the same accuracy for clean samples than for cor-
rupted samples. Its robustness scores would be equal to 1, so it could be consid-
ered as completely robust to any common corruption. Therefore, in this study,
before comparing the robustness scores of two neural networks we always make
sure that their clean accuracies are also comparable.
5.2 Performances of M-TLAT on the Perturbation Benchmark
For the first experiment we train one Resnet-50 and one ResNeXt-50, using the
M-TLAT algorithm. The training of these models took a dozen of hours using a
single GPU Nvidia Tesla V100. We also train one Resnet-50 and one ResNeXt-50
with the IAT algorithm [28]. We compute the robustness scores of the trained
models towards all the perturbations of the benchmark. The results are reported
in Table 1.
In Tables 1 and 2, the Clean column contains the accuracy of the models on
the not-corrupted test set. Each of the other columns contains the robustness
scores to a perturbation of the benchmark. For the corruptions of the ImageNet-
C benchmark, the displayed scores correspond to the mean robustness score
of the corruptions computed with their five severity levels. To better visualize
the effect of the augmentation algorithms, we use either a ”-” index or a ”+”
index, to signify if a model is less or more robust than the standard model to a
perturbation.
We observe in Table 1 that the models trained with M-TLAT are slightly
more accurate than the standard models on clean images. They are also more
robust than the standard models to every single tested common corruption.
We see that using M-TLAT makes neural networks much more robust to the
CW2 and PGD LL attacks. It also makes models less sensitive to black-box
adversarial examples. We observe that the robustness gain for the PGD attack
is less important.
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Table 1: Effect on robustness of M-TLAT and comparison with IAT
(a) Robustness scores towards the common corruptions of ImageNet-C
Clean Gauss Shot Impul Defocus Glass Motion Zoom Snow Fog Frost Bright Contr Elastic Pixelate Jpeg
ResNet standard 73.3 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.25 0.35 0.41 0.47 0.31 0.48 0.34 0.78 0.34 0.73 0.65 0.80
IAT 73.2− 0.47+ 0.46+ 0.42+ 0.51+ 0.65+ 0.58+ 0.68+ 0.49+ 0.78+ 0.66+ 0.79+ 0.78+ 0.84+ 0.82+ 0.63−
M-TLAT 73.9+ 0.56+ 0.54+ 0.52+ 0.41+ 0.61+ 0.58+ 0.63+ 0.49+ 0.59+ 0.61+ 0.82+ 0.58+ 0.85+ 0.94+ 0.95+
ResNeXt standard 76.4 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.28 0.37 0.44 0.48 0.36 0.53 0.37 0.79 0.36 0.75 0.72 0.74
IAT 74.7− 0.46+ 0.44+ 0.43+ 0.53+ 0.67+ 0.62+ 0.70+ 0.51+ 0.73+ 0.69+ 0.81+ 0.80+ 0.85+ 0.83+ 0.59−
M-TLAT 76.5+ 0.57+ 0.55+ 0.54+ 0.44+ 0.64+ 0.60+ 0.66+ 0.52+ 0.68+ 0.67+ 0.86+ 0.70+ 0.85+ 0.95+ 0.95+
(b) Robustness scores towards our
additional common corruptions
Obstru Color Trans Rot
ResNet standard 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.68
IAT 0.71− 0.89+ 0.75− 0.72+
M-TLAT 0.75+ 0.86+ 0.79+ 0.74+
ResNeXt standard 0.75 0.82 0.82 0.72
IAT 0.72− 0.90+ 0.77− 0.71−
M-TLAT 0.76+ 0.89+ 0.82 0.74+
(c) Robustness scores towards adversarial
examples
pgd
=0.04
pgd ll
=0.04
cw l2 mi fgsm
=0.04
mi fgsm
=0.08
ResNet standard 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.34
IAT 0.01+ 0.08+ 0.84+ 0.87+ 0.78+
M-TLAT 0.08+ 0.45+ 1.00+ 0.96+ 0.87+
ResNeXt standard 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.33
IAT 0.01+ 0.11+ 0.95+ 0.87+ 0.81+
M-TLAT 0.09+ 0.38+ 0.99+ 0.95+ 0.87+
For comparison, the IAT algorithm tends to reduce the clean accuracy. It
does not increase the robustness to all the common corruption of the bench-
mark. In particular, it significantly decreases the robustness towards the Jpeg
perturbation. Besides, the IAT models are significantly less robust to adversarial
examples than the M-TLAT models.
Using FGSM during training is known to poorly defend models against it-
erative adversarial attack such as PGD [27]. The robustness of the M-TLAT
models towards PGD can likely be increased by replacing FGSM by an iterative
adversarial attack [33]. But this would increase significantly the training time.
That is the reason why this option has not been tested yet.
To our knowledge, M-TLAT is the first data augmentation approach that is
able to increase the robustness to every single common corruption and adversar-
ial example of a large set of diverse perturbations, without reducing the clean
accuracy.
5.3 Complementarity between Mixup and TLAT
To better understand the effect of each constituent of the M-TLAT algorithm,
we proceed to an ablation study. Two ResNet-50 are respectively trained with
the Mixup and TLAT data augmentations. We report their robustness to the
perturbation benchmark in Table 2.
First, we notice that Mixup causes an increase of the clean accuracy, which
is coherent with observations made in [57]. On the contrary, TLAT makes the
trained model less accurate on the clean data. But those two effects seem to
cancel each other because the M-TLAT model and the standard model have
comparable clean accuracies as observed in Table 1a.
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Table 2: Influence on robustness of the Mixup and TLAT data augmentations
(a) Robustness scores towards the corruptions of ImageNet-C
Clean Gauss Shot Impul Defocus Glass Motion Zoom Snow Fog Frost Bright Contr Elastic Pixelate Jpeg
ResNet standard 73.3 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.25 0.35 0.41 0.47 0.31 0.48 0.34 0.78 0.34 0.73 0.65 0.80
Mixup 74.9+ 0.28+ 0.28+ 0.24+ 0.25 0.38+ 0.39− 0.53+ 0.38+ 0.79+ 0.53+ 0.78 0.75+ 0.75+ 0.58− 0.61−
TLAT 69.4− 0.57+ 0.54+ 0.51+ 0.43+ 0.60+ 0.56+ 0.60+ 0.41+ 0.15− 0.41+ 0.78 0.13− 0.84+ 0.94+ 0.97+
(b) Robustness scores towards our
additional common corruptions
Obstru Color Trans Rot
ResNet standard 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.68
Mixup 0.75+ 0.88+ 0.79+ 0.71+
TLAT 0.69− 0.76 0.67− 0.66−
(c) Robustness scores towards adversarial
examples
pgd
=0.04
pgd ll
=0.04
cw l2 mi fgsm
=0.04
mi fgsm
=0.08
ResNet standard 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.34
Mixup 0.00 0.00 0.202+ 0.61+ 0.22−
TLAT 0.10+ 0.74+ 0.97+ 0.98+ 0.93+
In Tables 2a and 2b, we observe that Mixup makes the trained model more
robust than the standard model to all the common corruptions but the Motion
Blur, Pixelate and Jpeg corruptions. We observe in Table 2c that Mixup has a
little influence on adversarial robustness, with either a slight increase or decrease
of the robustness depending on the considered attack.
Fortunately, TLAT makes models much more robust to any adversarial at-
tacks. Indeed, the TLAT model is much more difficult to attack with the black
box adversarial examples or with the CW2 attack. It is also significantly more
robust to PGD LL and slightly more robust to PGD. For common corruptions,
the effect of TLAT is very contrasted. Concerning the noise and blur corruptions
(the seven first corruptions of the Table 2a), the TLAT model is much more ro-
bust than the standard model. For some other common corruptions like Fog or
Contrast, the TLAT augmentation decreases significantly the robustness scores.
It is clear that the M-TLAT models are much more robust to adversarial
examples thanks to the contribution of TLAT. However, for common corrup-
tions, Mixup and TLAT are remarkably complementary. Concerning the few
corruptions for which Mixup has a very negative effect on robustness (Jpeg and
Pixelate), TLAT has a strong positive effect. Similarly, for the Fog and Contrast
corruptions, TLAT makes models less robust while Mixup makes them much
more robust.
The ablation study indicates that both components are important to increase
the robustness to a large diversity of perturbations.
5.4 Labeling in Adversarial Trainings
Comparison of the Labeling Strategies
Adversarial trainings increase the adversarial robustness of the trained models,
but they also reduce their accuracy on clean samples [47],[27]. In this section, we
want to show that TLAT decreases less the clean accuracy of the trained models
than traditional adversarial trainings.
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To achieve it, we trained four ResNet-50 with different kinds of adversarial
training algorithms. The first model is trained using untarget FGSM and the
second is trained using target FGSM with randomly chosen target. Both use
adversarial examples labeled with the ground-truth labels. We train another
model with target FGSM but regularized via label smoothing (LS) [41], we call
it the LS model. For this model, we use a smoothing parameter equal to , where
 is the amount of the FGSM perturbation. In other words, the one values of
the one-hot encoding vectors are replaced by 1 −  and the zeros are replaced
by /N where N is the number of classes. The fourth model is trained using
the TLAT algorithm. All models are trained with minibatches that contain both
clean samples and adversarial examples. We measure the clean accuracy of those
models: results are displayed in Table 3.
We see that TLAT is the adversarial training method that reduces the less
the clean accuracy. This result shows that TLAT is important to preserve the
clean accuracy of the models trained with M-TLAT, all the while making them
more robust to adversarial examples.
Using soft labels in trainings is known to help models to generalize [36],[41].
Here we want to make sure that the usage of soft labels is not the main reason of
high clean accuracy of TLAT. To achieve it, we compare the performances of the
TLAT and LS models. Even if the LS model also uses soft labels during training,
it performs worse than the TLAT model. Consequently, the good performances
of TLAT are not due to the usage of soft labels. We believe TLAT performs well
because it uses labels that contain information about the target of the adversarial
examples.
Table 3: Comparison of the performances of the TLAT augmentation with the
performances of other kinds of adversarial trainings
standard FGSM target-FGSM LS TLAT
clean accuracy 73.3 65.8 68.3 67.1 69.4
Interpretation
The TLAT augmentation is motivated by the works of Ilyas et al [19]. In their
study, they reveal the existence of brittle yet highly predictive features in the
data. Neural networks largely depend on those features even if they are nearly
invisible to human eye. They are called non-robust features. Ilyas et al. show
that a model that only uses non-robust features to complete properly a task still
generalize well on unseen data.
They use this phenomenon to interpret adversarial vulnerability. Adversarial
attacks are small perturbations, so they mainly affect non-robust features. They
can especially make those brittle features anti-correlated with the true label. As
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neural networks largely rely on non-robust features, their behaviour is completely
disturbed by adversarial attacks.
In Adversarial trainings, neural networks encounter adversarial examples that
can have non-robust features uncorrelated with the true label. The trained mod-
els are then constrained to less rely on non-robust features. This can explain
the success of adversarial training: adversarially trained models give less impor-
tance to non-robust features so they are much more difficult to attack with small
perturbations.
Despite its efficiency, adversarial training generally causes a decrease in clean
accuracy [47],[27],[56]. One possible reason could be that adversarial patterns in
the training adversarial examples are not coherent with the ground-truth label.
Consequently, an adversarially trained model encounters samples for which the
features are not completely coherent with labelling.
The proposed method tries to make the labeling of target adversarial exam-
ples more correlated with its non-robust features. Targeted adversarial attacks
make non-robust features of a sample correlated with a target class. So instead
of labelling only with the ground-truth class of the attacked sample, the method
introduces a part related to the target class. Therefore, the trained model still
learns the true original class of the attacked sample, but the label used for learn-
ing is more correlated with the non-robust features of this sample. We believe
this could be the reason why our method has better performance than traditional
target adversarial training in practice.
6 Conclusion
We propose a new data augmentation strategy that increases the robustness of
neural networks to a large set of common corruptions and adversarial examples.
The experiments carried out suggest that the effect of M-TLAT is always pos-
itive: basically, it increases the robustness to any corruption without reducing
the clean accuracy. We believe using M-TLAT can be particularly useful to help
industrials to increase the robustness of their neural networks without being
afraid of any counterpart.
As part of the M-TLAT algorithm, we use the new adversarial augmentation
strategy TLAT. We show that models trained with TLAT have a better accuracy
on clean samples than the models trained with a standard adversarial training
algorithm. The idea of TLAT is to interpolate the target labels of adversarial
examples with the ground-truth labels. This operation is computationally negli-
gible and can be used in any trainings with target adversarial examples in order
to improve the clean accuracy.
In future works, we would like to replace FGSM by an iterative adversarial
attack in our algorithm and observe how this would influence the clean accuracy
and the adversarial robustness of the models trained with M-TLAT. It would
be also interesting to replace Mixup by a different interpolation strategy such
as Manifold Mixup [49], and test if it further improves the performances of the
algorithm.
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